This paper develops a real options model of capital structure to understand two distinct roles played by intellectual capital in corporate financing decisions. First, intellectual capital limits a firm's debt capacity because of its low liquidation value. Second, intellectual capital enhances a firm's debt capacity through its positive impact on the earnings dynamics. We show that the former is dominated by the latter within our model so that intellectual capital positively affects leverage as measured by market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios. Using three patent-based variables as proxies for intellectual capital, we find robust evidence that a positive relationship between a firm's intellectual capital and its leverage ratio prevails. The effect of intellectual capital on leverage is also economically significant. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation-increase in intellectual capital increase a firm's market leverage ratio by 11.7-27.3% from the sample mean level (22.2%). We further find that the positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage is much stronger for high-tech firms than for non-high-tech firms. Finally, we document time-series evidence that increases in intellectual capital over a five-year time window lead to increases in firm leverage intertemporally. Evidence from the U.S. Patent Data Abstract This paper develops a real options model of capital structure to understand two distinct roles played by intellectual capital in corporate financing decisions. First, intellectual capital limits a firm's debt capacity because of its low liquidation value. Second, intellectual capital enhances a firm's debt capacity through its positive impact on the earnings dynamics. We show that the former is dominated by the latter within our model so that intellectual capital positively affects leverage as measured by market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios. Using three patent-based variables as proxies for intellectual capital, we find robust evidence that a positive relationship between a firm's intellectual capital and its leverage ratio prevails. The effect of intellectual capital on leverage is also economically significant. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation-increase in intellectual capital increase a firm's market leverage ratio by 11.7-27.3% from the sample mean level (22.2%). We further find that the positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage is much stronger for hightech firms than for non-high-tech firms. Finally, we document time-series evidence that increases in intellectual capital over a five-year time window lead to increases in firm leverage intertemporally.
Introduction
The research on the financing behavior of firms has resulted in a series of findings. On the theoretical front, taxes, bankruptcy costs, information asymmetries, and agency conflicts have been advocated as important explanations for corporate financing decisions (see, e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1991) .
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On the empirical front, firm size, growth opportunities, asset tangibility, business risk, measures of information asymmetries have been identified as relevant determinants of leverage ratios (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . Recent empirical work also highlights the importance of market timing on capital structure choices (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002) .
In this paper, we investigate a relatively unexplored question in the capital structure literature: "How does a firm's intellectual capital affect its financing decision?" To this end, we develop a parsimonious model that is used to motivate our empirical study. Specifically, we incorporate intellectual capital into a standard real options model of capital structureà la Leland (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001) . The way that intellectual capital affects a firm's financing decision is modeled via two distinct channels. First, intellectual capital in general has lower liquidation value, which translates into higher bankruptcy costs, thereby imposing a negative indirect effect that limits a firm's debt capacity. Second, intellectual capital affects the dynamics of a firm's growth opportunities and earnings processes. For example, a higher level of intellectual capital is more likely to result in technological innovations. Indeed, there is abundant empirical evidence that intellectual capital increases firm-level productivity and market value (see, e.g., Griliches, 1990; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Darby et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2005) . We as such assume that intellectual capital enhances a firm's earnings dynamics, which gives rise to a positive direct effect that augments the firm's debt capacity. Within our model that is a variant of the standard real options model of capital structure, we show that the negative indirect effect is dominated by the positive direct effect so that the overall effect of intellectual capital on leverage, measured by market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios, is unambiguously positive.
We empirically test our model's predications. One innovation in our empirical analysis is that we employ various patent-based measures to capture a firm's intellectual capital stock. Patents have long been recognized as a rich data source, and have also been used in prior economics and finance research (see, e.g., Griliches, 1981; Pakes, 1985; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hall et al., 2005) . The number of patents owned by a firm at any given point in time is a good proxy for the amount of intellectual capital to which the firm has access. Unlike R&D expenditures, patents gauge the output of innovative activities, and signify innovations that are novel, non-obvious, and useful in a legally defined sense. Patents also exclude others from the unauthorized use of the disclosed invention. One caveat is that the "importance" of patents, or the commercial value of patents, varies significantly. Simply counting the number of patents may not reflect the actual amount of intellectual capital possessed by a firm. In an intuitive sense, either the number of citations that a patent receives, or the number of claims that a patent applies may serve a better purpose in recognizing the heterogeneity in the patent value. Throughout our empirical analysis, we as such construct three patent-based variables-the patent stock, the citation-weighted patent stock, and the claim-weighted patent stock-to measure the amount of intellectual capital. To control for the size effect as well as the input of innovative activities, we scale the three variables by the R&D stock to yield the ultimate patent-based metrics for intellectual capital.
Our extensive empirical analysis offers several innovative findings. First, after controlling for firm size, R&D expenditures, asset tangibility, profitability, business risk, market-to-book, and other standard factors that are commonly used in the empirical capital structure literature, we find that Intellectual Capital and Financing Decisions: Evidence from the U.S. Patent Data 3 our patent-based metrics for intellectual capital positively affect market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios. The effect is both statistically and economically significant. In the universe of the Compustat firms with detailed patent information available, a one-standard-deviation-increase in an average firm's intellectual capital (measured by the three different patent-based variables) leads to a 11.7-27.3% increase in its market leverage ratio from the sample mean level (22.2%). Second, we identify robust evidence that the effect of intellectual capital on capital structure is asymmetric across firms, and it tends to be more pronounced among high-tech firms and/or firms operating in R&D intensive and technologically innovative business environments. Everything else equal, the estimated coefficients of the intellectual capital effect on leverage among high-tech firms are two to four times of those among non-high-tech firms. Finally, we find that firms with an increasing amount of intellectual capital from year t − 5 to year t significantly raise their leverage ratios over the five-year time horizon. This provides time-series evidence that changes in intellectual capital are positively related to changes in leverage ratios.
We organize the remaining paper as follows. Section 2 briefly review the literature and relates our results to it. Section 3 describes our real options model of capital structure from which we derive a positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage. Section 4 discusses the data and variable used in our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical findings and the results of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
A broad literature review seems to suggest a negative relationship between a firm's intellectual capital stock and its leverage ratio. For example, Williamson (1988) links a firm's debt capacity with the liquidation value of its assets. If the degree of redeployability of the assets is low, the debt capacity would also be low. Since it is reasonable to believe that intellectual capital has a low degree of redeployability, intellectual capital intensive firms should rely less on debt.
2 Berk et al. (2007) show that intellectual capital intensive firms are likely to face greater indirect costs of bankruptcy due to entrenched employees facing substantial costs from wage cuts and having to earn the market wage. This further reinforces the negative relationship between intellectual capital and leverage. If a larger amount of intellectual capital is associated with more growth options, the debt overhang problem of Myers (1977) is in effect and thus intellectual capital intensive firms should borrow less.
2 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) come to the same conclusion, albeit with a slightly different argument. When a financially distressed firm needs to sell its assets, its industry peers are likely to encounter similar problems themselves, thereby rendering the assets to be sold at prices below their values in the best use, which constitutes private costs of debt ex ante. Finally, firms with more intellectual capital may suffer from serious informational problems about their assets in place and/or growth opportunities. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) , these firms should use internal funds first before opting for external financing and thus may eventually have less debt. Empirically, Titman and Wessels (1988) find a negative relationship between R&D expenditures and leverage ratios. Mackie-Mason (1990) and Graham (2000) use a firm's spending on R&D and advertising as a measure of the firm's intangible assets, whereas Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) use the market-to-book ratio as another measure of intangible assets. All of them document that increases in a firm's intangible assets lower the leverage ratio.
The contribution of this paper to the extant literature is twofold. First, we incorporate intellectual capital into a standard real options model of capital structureà la Leland (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001) by specifying two distinct roles played by intellectual capital in a firm's financing decision. On the one hand, intellectual capital limits the firm's debt capacity because of its low liquidation value. On the other hand, intellectual capital enhances the firm's debt capacity through its positive impact on the earnings dynamics. While there is abundant empirical evidence that intellectual capital increases firm-level productivity and market value (see, e.g., Griliches, 1990; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Darby et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2005) , there are no theoretical capital structure studies that explicitly take this fact into account. Indeed, we show that the positive effect of intellectual capital on leverage dominates the negative effect within our model. Hence, the positive impact of intellectual capital on the earnings dynamics reconciles the seemingly conflicting predications of how intellectual capital affects a firm's financing decision. Our second contribution is to empirically verify that a positive relationship between a firm's intellectual capital and its leverage ratio prevails. Using patent-based metrics to proxy for a firm's intellectual capital stock, we find intriguing evidence that intellectual capital and leverage are positively related, and that this phenomenon is more pronounced among high-tech firms than non-high-tech firms.
Our paper is related to the recent work by Atanassov et al. (2007) . They hypothesize that firms engage in innovative activities should rely more on arm's length financing (public debt and equity) than on relationship based financing (bank loans). The rationale is that banks, lacking the ability to evaluate innovative projects, tend to discourage firms from investing in novel technologies and be prone to abandon the ongoing ones. Using similar patent-based metrics as ours to proxy for a firm's innovative output, Atanassov et al. (2007) document that firms that produce more novel innovations have a higher proportion of equity and public debt financing in their capital structure.
Their empirical findings are consistent with ours. We document further that the increase in the value of equity is smaller than that in the value of debt so that the market leverage ratio rises in Intellectual Capital and Financing Decisions: Evidence from the U.S. Patent Data 5 response to increases in intellectual capital. Manso (2009) shows that the optimal incentive contracts that encourage innovation are different from the incentive contracts required to encourage tried and tested work methods. In Manso (2009)'s principal-agent framework, the agent can attempt to innovate, employ tried and test work methods, or shirk. In such a framework, debt financing may be a tool to dissuade the agent from shirking.
Since the need to encourage innovation is more important in intellectual capital intensive firms, such firms may resort to debt financing to avoid agents shirking, thereby limiting the agents' choice to innovate versus implementing tried and tested work methods. In our model, the use of debt financing is motivated by a trade-off between interest tax shield benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt. As such, leverage plays a role over and above other alternative tools such as incentive contracts to solve the problems faced by intellectual capital intensive firms.
Using a real options approach, Tselukevich (2008) shows that when capital stock is required to exercise growth options, firms do not immediately invest in the capital stock in response to an innovation shock in the industry should there be a wedge between the buy-sell prices of capital.
Assets in place generate taxable revenues while the unexploited growth options increases the value of equity. If the wedge between the buy-sell prices of capital is lower for firms with more intellectual capital, it follows that such firms will invest to exploit their growth options faster than other firms.
As such, the taxable revenues will be higher for firms with more intellectual capital and the value of embedded growth options would be lower for such firms. Given the higher taxable revenues, firms with more intellectual capital take on more debt, thereby rendering the same prediction of a positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage as in our model. Of course, this argument is valid only when the number of unexploited growth options does not vary, or decreases, with the amount of intellectual capital. In a more likely scenario wherein these two variables are positively associated, it is unclear how intellectual capital would affect a firm's leverage ratio, in particular the market leverage ratio, as both the values of debt and equity are affected in the same direction. 
The Model
Consider a firm that is endowed with a fixed amount of intellectual capital, I > 1. The firm is infinitely lived and operates in continuous time, where time is indexed by t ∈ [0, ∞). The corporate income tax system is symmetric with full loss-offset provisions and a constant tax rate, τ ∈ (0, 1).
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The default-free term structure is flat with a known instantaneous rate of interest, r > 0.
At t = 0, the firm needs to raise a fixed amount of physical capital, K > 0, by issuing debt and equity. This physical capital, combining with the endowed intellectual capital, generates a perpetual stream of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), {F (K, I)X t : t ≥ 0}, where F (K, I) denotes the scale of the firm's operation, and X t is an exogenous random shock to the firm's EBIT at time t. Both the physical and intellectual capital can enhance the firm's operation and thus increase the stream of EBIT so that ∂F (K, I)/∂K > 0 and ∂F (K, I)/∂I > 0.
4 Given that K and I are fixed, we can, without any loss of generality, specify that F (K, I) = KI.
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The state variable, X t , evolves over time according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
where µ < r and σ > 0 are constant parameters, and {Z t : t ≥ 0} is a standard Wiener process defined on the risk-neutral probability space, (Ω, F , Q). 6 The initial value of the state variable,
(1) implies that the growth rate of X t is normally distributed with a mean, µ∆t, and a variance, σ 2 ∆t, over a time interval, ∆t.
The firm issues perpetual debt at t = 0 to raise D(C) from debtholders, where C ≥ 0 is a constant instantaneous coupon payment endogenously chosen by the firm to maximize the ex-ante equity value prior to the debt issuance. The difference, K −D(C), is raised from (paid to if negative)
shareholders whose claim right after the debt issuance is worth E(C). The ex-ante equity value is,
is the value of the firm. Both the value of debt, D(C), and the value of equity, E(C), are fairly priced in arbitrage-free and complete capital markets under the risk-neutral probability space, (Ω, F , Q).
Before default occurs, the firm always pays the coupon payments to debtholders, which are taxdeductible to yield the interest tax shield, τ C, per unit time. Shareholders have limited liability and thus the option to default on their debt obligations. The optimal policy for shareholders is to default at the first instant when the value of equity vanishes (see, e.g., Leland, 1994 , Goldstein et al., 2001 Morellec, 2001 The liquidation value of the firm, i.e., the unlevered value of the firm's assets taking the dissipation of intellectual capital into account, is thus given
Since absolute priority is enforced, shareholders get nothing and debtholders receive the liquidation value upon default.
Valuation of Corporate Securities
At time s when the state variable is at X s , we denote T Xs X = inf{t ≥ s : X t = X} as the first passage time of {X t : t ≥ s} to reach a given threshold, X, from above, and E Xs Q [·] as the expectation operator with respect to the risk-neutral probability measure, Q, conditional on the state variable starting off at X s . For an exogenously given coupon payment, C > 0, the value of equity at t = 0, E(C), is given by
and the value of debt at t = 0, D(C), is given by
where X D (C) is the default trigger that maximizes E(C). Eqs. (2) and (3) state that debtholders collect the coupon payment, C, and shareholders receive the residual cash flow, (1 − τ )(KIX − C), per unit time until default occurs at the first instant when the default trigger, X D (C), is reached from above. Then, shareholders get nothing and debtholders receive the liquidation value, (1 −
the default date. 8 Since I > 1 and η ∈ (0, 1), we have I η < I. 9 Allowing the physical capital to be aversely affected by bankruptcy would not alter our qualitative results.
It is well-known (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ) that (4) gives us the stochastic discount factor that accounts for both the timing and the probability of one dollar received at the first instant when the default trigger, X D (C), is reached from above starting off at the initial value,
Using Eq. (4), we can write Eqs. (2) and (3) as
and
Differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to X D (C) and solving the first-order condition yields the default trigger:
It is evident from Eq. (7) that KIX D (C) < C, i.e., the firm is insolvent on a flow basis at the default instant (see also Leland, 1994 , Goldstein et al., 2001 Morellec, 2001 ).
Eq. (5) has the following interpretation. The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is the value of equity if default is forbidden. The second term captures the value of the default option,
is the present value of the savings from contributing additional equity capital to cover subsequent shortfalls at the instant when the default option is exercised, which is discounted to t = 0 by the
Eq. (6) has the following interpretation. The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (6) is the value of debt if default is forbidden. The second term is the reduction in value due to default, where
is the change in debt value at the instant when default occurs, which is discounted to t = 0 by the stochastic discount factor, [X D (C)/X 0 ] α . Using Eq. (7), we can write this term as
The first term of the above expression is the value of the default option that debtholders give to shareholders. The second term is the loss in all subsequent interest tax-shield benefits upon default,
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Optimal Leverage
For an exogenously given coupon payment, C, the value of the firm at t = 0, V (C), is given by the sum of the value of debt, D(C), and the value of equity, E(C). Using Eqs. (5) and (6), we have
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) is the value of the firm if it is unlevered. The second term is the value of the interest tax-shield benefits of debt. The last term captures the loss in value due to the dissipation of intellectual capital of amount I η .
At t = 0, the firm chooses a coupon payment, C ≥ 0, per unit time so as to maximize the ex-ante equity value:
where V (C) is defined in Eq. (8). The first-order condition for Program (9) is given by
where C * is the optimal coupon payment and
The left-hand side of Eq. (10) is the known marginal interest tax-shield benefit of debt, while the right-hand side is the marginal cost upon default, which includes the loss due to forgone interest tax-shield benefits and the loss due to the dissipation of intellectual capital, discounted to t = 0 by the stochastic discount factor,
Using Eq. (7), we solve Eq. (10) to yield
It then follows from Eqs. (7) and (11) that X * D < X 0 . Substituting Eqs. (7) and (11) into Eqs. (5) and (6) yields the optimal values of equity and debt at t = 0:
This completes the closed-form solution to the model.
Relationship between Intellectual Capital and Leverage
We use three different financial ratios to measure the firm's leverage. First, we define the firm's interest coverage ratio at t = 0 as the ratio between the constant coupon payment, C * , and the initial EBIT, KIX 0 :
where we have used Eq. (11). Second, we define the firm's book leverage ratio at t = 0 as the ratio between the value of debt at t = 0, D(C * ), and the book value of assets, K:
where we have used Eq. (13). Second, we define the firm's market leverage ratio at t = 0 as the ratio between the value of debt at t = 0, D(C * ), and the value of the firm at
where we have used Eqs. (12) and (13).
Differentiating Eq. (14) we with respect to I yields
Differentiating Eq. (15) we with respect to I yields
Differentiating Eq. (16) with respect to I yields
Since α > 0, the expression inside the curly brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (19) is gretaer
which is strictly positive. Hence, Eq.
Irrespective of whether the market leverage, book leverage, or interest coverage ratio is used, we derive from Eqs. (17), (18), and (19) that a positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage prevails. The intuition of these comparative static results is as follows. An increase in intellectual capital increases the firm's EBIT over time and thus raises both the value of equity and the value of debt, holding the coupon payment fixed. Such an increase in intellectual capital, on the other hand, increases the dissipated loss in case of bankruptcy but at a decreasing rate, thereby lowering the marginal bankruptcy cost of debt. The firm as such is induced to issue more debt by choosing a higher coupon payment, as is evident from Eq. (11). The increase in coupon payments enhances the value of debt further as compared to that of equity. The immediate consequences are that the interest coverage ratio, the book leverage ratio, and the market leverage ratio of the firm go up in response to the increase in intellectual capital.
Data and Variable Construction
Using a variant of the standard real options model of capital structure, we have established a positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage. In this section, we describe the data and variables constructed for testing the predictions of our model.
To conduct proper empirical tests, it is crucial for us to identify good proxies for a firm's intellectual capital stock. The existing literature commonly opts for R&D expenditures as a firmlevel measure of "knowledge stock." One caveat of this approach is that R&D expenditures largely reflect the input of intellectual capital creation rather than the output of the R&D process. In light of this caveat, Griliches (1990) , Trajtenberg (1990) , and others suggest that patents offer a better data source for the study of innovation and technical change. A patent is a property right to a knowledge asset. Compared to R&D investments, patents are more directly related to the outcome of a firm's innovative activity, thereby more precisely representing the firm's knowledge assets. We as such use patent-based metrics to construct firm-level measures of intellectual capital.
Data and Sampling Process
Our data come mainly from two sources. The first is the patent database compiled by the landmark research program initiated by the late Zvi Griliches and his collaborators at the NBER. These data cover detailed information on all patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1963 and 1999. The second data source is the Compustat files that include data of all firms traded on the U.S. stock market. The matching of these two data sets by firm names is a daunting task because the USPTO does not provide a unique identifier for each patenting organization (firm in our study) from year to year, and patenting firms may change their names from time to time. Such matching, however, becomes feasible with the availability of the NBER data files on patents, their claims, and citations, which can be downloaded at http://www.nber.org/patents/. The matching of patent assignees and firms has been largely completed by researchers using the same patent data (for details see Hall et al., 2005 
Measures of Intellectual Capital
We use three patent-based metrics to compute our measures of firm-level intellectual capital. First, we use a simple count of patents as an indicator of innovative output. Denote P atent i,t as the number of the patents applied for in year t by firm i. Assuming a single depreciation rate, δ, for patent value, we compute the patent stock (P atent Stock) in year t for firm i by
Eq. (20) thus offers us a measure of a firm's intellectual capital over time.
Using simple patent counts unavoidably introduces biases. Indeed, there are differences among technologies and sectors in the importance of patents to serve the role of protection against imitation. There are also differences among firms in their propensity to patent especially unimportant 11 To account for the quality difference across patents, and to fix the biases due to the use of simple patent counts, we compose two other patent-based metrics that use the number of citations a patent receives and the number of claims a patent has.
We retrieve from the NBER patent database the number of subsequent citations a patent receives to construct a citation-weighted patent count. We denote Citation i,t as the total number of citations to patents applied for in year t by firm i between year t and 1999. We compute the citation-weighted patent stock (Citation Stock) in year t for firm i by
Likewise, we retrieve from the NBER patent database the number of claims a patent has to construct a claim-weighted patent count. We denote Claim i,t as the total number of claims by patents applied for in year t by firm i between year t and 1999. We compute the claim-weighted patent stock (Claim Stock) in year t for firm i by
Both the citation-weighted and claim-weighted patent stocks are likely to be better measures of a firm's intellectual capital over time than the patent stock because they control for the heterogeneity in patent values by weighing patents with their subsequent citations and claims, respectively.
We follow the existing research that uses patent data to assume that the depreciation rate, δ, is 20%, noting that our empirical results are not sensitive to this chosen value. The three patent-based metrics defined in Eqs. (20), (21), and (22) capture the output of a firm's innovative activity. Unlike R&D expenditures, these three variables may not take into account the input of the innovations. In fact, larger firms tend to have greater R&D expenditures. To address this size effect, we compute the R&D stock (R&D Stock) in year t for firm i by replacing P atent i,t and P atent Stock in Eq.
(20) by the R&D expenditures in year t by firm i and R&D Stock, respectively. We scale the three patent-based metrics by the R&D stock to obtain our final intellectual capital measures.
Measures of Leverage
We follow the empirical capital structure literature to use three conventional measures of leverage:
book leverage, market leverage, and interest coverage ratios. We define the book leverage ratio as the ratio of total debt (debt in current liabilities + long term debt) to total assets. Likewise, we define the market leverage ratio as the total debt (as above) divided by the market value of assets (total assets − book equity + market capitalization). Finally, we define the interest coverage ratio as the ratio of interest expenses to operating income before depreciation.
Other Control Variables
Previous empirical studies have identified a number of factors that are related to a firm's optimal financing decision. We control for the effects of these factors in our empirical analysis.
Firm size is positively related to leverage (see e.g., Graham et al., 1998; Hovalimian et al., 2001 ).
Larger firms are relatively more diversified and thus are less prone to bankruptcy. We use the logarithm of total sales as a measure of firm size.
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Business risk negatively affects a firm's leverage ratio (see, e.g., Kale et al., 1991; Faulkender and Petersen, 2005) . A firm tends to borrow less in an uncertain business environment. We compute the annualized percentage volatility of stock returns, using previous year's monthly returns scaled by the average monthly return. This is used as a proxy for business risk.
Firms with more growth opportunities use less debt (Myers 1977) . In our empirical analysis, we use the market to book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities. We calculate the market to book ratio as the ratio of the market value of assets (total assets − book equity + market capitalization)
to the book value of assets (total assets).
R&D intensity is a key variable in our empirical analysis. It captures both a firm's non-debt tax shields and growth opportunities. In the presence of better measures of intellectual capital and growth opportunities, we expect that R&D intensity mainly works as a proxy for a firm's non-debt tax shields and future growth and thus affects leverage negatively. We compute R&D intensity as the total amount of R&D expenditures in a given year divided by total sales.
The characteristics of assets may also affect a firm's leverage. For example, if the tangibility of assets is higher, it is easier for the firm to liquidate the assets and recover their value. Therefore, there is a positive relation between a firm's tangibility of assets and its leverage level. We define a firm's collateral as the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets. We expect collateral to be positively related to leverage ratios. Titman (1984) presents a model in which a firm's liquidation decision is causally linked to its bankruptcy status. As a result, the costs that a firm can potentially impose on its customers, suppliers, and workers by liquidation are relevant to its capital structure decision. Customers, workers, and suppliers of the firm that produces unique or specialized products probably suffer relatively higher costs upon liquidation. Therefore, uniqueness is expected to be negatively related to debt ratios. We use selling, general and administrative expenses over total assets as the proxy for a firm's uniqueness, and expect it to be negatively related to leverage ratios. Myers (1984) suggests that firms have a pecking order of financing: the most preferred source is retained earnings, then debt financing, and the least preferred source is equity financing. This may be due to the issuance costs of debt and equity, or due to the information asymmetry discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984) . In either case, we expect that the amount of earnings available for retention is an important determinant of a firm's capital structure. The more profitable a firm is, the less levered the firm will be. We use the ratio of operating income over total assets as an indicator of profitability. We expect this variable to be negatively correlated with leverage ratios.
Finally, we define N OLCF as the ratio of net operating loss carry forward to total assets. This variable captures non-debt tax shields and thus is expected to be negatively related to leverage ratios.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we first present the summary statistics of our sample. Then, we report the empirical evidence that strongly supports the predications of our model. Robustness checks are also conducted. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. The mean patent stock, mean citationweighted patent stock, and mean claim-weighted patent stock are 9.493, 53.813, and 122.997, respectively. The standard deviations of the three patent-based metrics are all very high, implying that the distribution of firm-level intellectual capital is highly asymmetric among firms in our sample.
Summary Statistics
Furthermore, these three variables have their medians much less than their means, which suggests that their distributions are significantly right-skewed (i.e., a small portion of firms owns a significant amount of intellectual capital). The summary statistics of the three leverage measures (market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios) and the other control variables are largely in lines with those reported in previous studies on capital structure. 
Empirical Results Based on the Full Sample
In order to examine how intellectual capital affects a firm's leverage decision, we run regressions using the full sample that contains all the Compustat firms (except financial firms and regulated utilities) with patent information available. Table 3 presents our univariate and multivariate regression results.
In Table 3 , we use the three different intellectual capital measures separately. Panel A reports the regression results that use the book leverage ratio as the dependent variable, while Panel B
and Panel C report those that use the market leverage ratio and the interest coverage ratio as the dependent variables, respectively. All three panels share the same structure: Models (1) and (2) use the citation-weighted patent stock as the measure of intellectual capital; Models (3) and (4) use the claim-weighted patent stock; and Models (5) and (6) use the patent stock. While Models (1), (3), and (5) are univariate regressions, Models (2), (4), and (6) are multivariate regressions that include the other control variables (i.e., firm size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, R&D intensity, business risk, uniqueness, and net operating loss carry forward). In all multivariate regressions, we control for both year-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects.
A few findings that are consistent with the main prediction of our model (i.e., intellectual capital positively affects firm leverage) emanate from Table 3 . First, as shown in Models (1), (3), and (5) of all three panels, where the measures of intellectual capital are used as the sole independent variable, we find that all of them, except Claim stock in Panel C when the interest coverage ratio is used as the leverage measure, enter the univariate regressions positively and statistically significantly.
Second, in Models (2), (4), and (6) of all three panels, where the standard control variables that explain leverage are added, we still identify a statistically significant role played by the intellectual capital measures. Except Claim Stock in Panel C, the coefficient estimates of the three variables are all positive and statistically significant, suggesting that an increase in intellectual capital raises a firm's leverage ratio. Third, the economic magnitude of the effect of intellectual capital on leverage is highly significant. Using Model (2) of Panel B as an example, a one-standard-deviation-increase in the citation-weighted patent stock (931.437) leads to a 2.7% increase in the market leverage ratio, which represents a 11.7% increase from the mean level (0.222).
13 Likewise, a one-standard-deviationincrease in the claim-weighted patent stock (the patent stock) gives rise to a 6.1% (4%) increase in the market leverage ratio, or a 27.3% (18.1%) increase from the mean level.
Table 3 also shows that the other control variables by and large have the signs and significance as those reported in the extant empirical capital structure literature. Specifically, we find that firm size and tangibility of assets are in most cases positively and significantly related to leverage. We also find in most model specifications that R&D intensity, profitability, market-to-book, uniqueness, and net loss carry forward are all negatively related to leverage. Business risk, albeit not significant, has a negative sign in most cases. In all regressions, R&D intensity, which is computed as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales, has a negative and significant sign. In our empirical analysis, R&D expenditures are likely to play two different roles. First, they might capture a firm's non-debt tax shields so that higher R&D intensity makes debt financing less attractive. Second, they might serve as a noisy measure of intellectual capital. However, we believe that the second role could have been dominated by the more precise measures of intellectual capital, thereby justifying the negative sign of R&D intensity on leverage.
High-Tech vs. Non-High-Tech Firms
The results in Table 3 offer strong evidence to support our claim that intellectual capital enhances a firm's debt capacity. Furthermore, we find that the documented intellectual capital effect on firm leverage is economically significant. We expect the effect of intellectual capital on leverage to be even more profound among intellectual capital intensive firms (i.e., high-tech firms). Our rationale goes as follows. The recent years have witnessed the birth, formation, and fast-growth of high-tech industries. Two features distinguish high-tech industries from others: intensive R&D investment and the crucial role played by intellectual capital. Take biotechnology as an example. 14 The biotechnology industry is an industry that has purely emerged from several innovative ideas and scientific breakthroughs-the double-helix structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in the 1950s; restriction enzymes used to splice human DNA into microbes developed in the 1970s; and recombinant insulin approved for human use in the 1980s. The profitability and growth prospects of a biotechnology firm is thus directly determined by the amount of intellectual capital to which the firm has access.
It goes without saying that intellectual capital is the most important asset in place that underpins a high-tech firm's core competence. We hypothesize that the effect of intellectual capital on leverage is significantly larger for high-tech firms than for non-high-tech firms. We test this hypothesis by sorting our sample into two sub-samples based on four-digit SIC industry codes. Any firms in our sample with the four-digit SIC industry codes falling into 2833-2836 (drug), 3661-3669 (telecom equipment), 3671-3679 (semi-conductors), and 3841-3845 (surgical equipment) have intensive intellectual capital and are classified as high-tech firms.
15 All other firms in our sample are then classified as non-high-tech firms. Table 4 presents the multivariate regression results.
Models (1)- (3) of Table 4 are multivariate regressions based on the sub-sample of high-tech firms, while Models (4)- (6) are those based on the sub-sample of non-high-tech firms. The model specifications are exactly the same as those in Table 3 , in which we report the results of using (1) and (4), we find that the estimated coefficient of the citation-weighted patent stock, which is used to measure intellectual capital, for the high-tech firms is about two times as large as that for non-high-tech firms (0.0450 vs. 0.0223). Comparing Models (2) and (5), we find that the estimated coefficient of the claim-weighted patent stock for high-tech firms is almost four times as large as that for non-hightech firms (0.0381 vs. 0.0098). Finally, comparing Models (3) and (6), we find that the estimated coefficient of the patent stock for high-tech firms is almost four-times as big as that for non-high-tech firms (0.3909 vs. 0.1074). The same pattern is also observed in Panel A, where the book leverage ratio is used as the dependent variable, and in Panel C, where the interest coverage ratio is the measure of firm leverage. The evidence from Table 4 clearly demonstrates that intellectual capital exerts much stronger influence on the financing decisions of high-tech firms than non-high-tech firms.
To contrast the economic magnitude of the effect of intellectual capital on leverage between high-tech firms and non-high-tech firms, we use Models (1) and (4) in Panel B for comparison. The estimated coefficient of the citation-weighted patent stock in Model (1) is 0.0450. A one-standarddeviation-increase in this variable (931.437) leads to a 4.18% increase in the market leverage ratio, which represents a 18.87% increase from the mean level (0.222). Nevertheless, a one-standarddeviation-increase in the citation-weighted patent stock in Model (4) leads to a 2.07% increase in the market leverage ratio, which only represents a 9.35% increase from the mean level. The economic magnitude is thus much smaller for non-high-tech firms than for high-tech firms.
Five-Year Changes in Leverage and Intellectual Capital
As a robustness check, we examine the effect of changes in intellectual capital on changes in leverage over time. We specifically examine how a five-year change in intellectual capital affects a five-year change in leverage. 16 We specify the following regression equation:
In Eq. (23), we use P atent Stock, Claim Stock, and Citation Stock separately to measure the amount of intellectual capital to which a firm has access, and the market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios to capture a firm's leverage ratio. If an increase in intellectual capital indeed enhances a firm's debt capacity over time, we expect that the coefficient of P atent Stock t − P atent Stock t−5 , i.e., β 2 , to be significantly positive. While the control variables are similar to those in previous analysis and are standard in capital structure regressions, here they are in the changes over a 5-year horizon.
In Table 5 , we report the results from estimating Eq. (23). Models (1)-(3) report the results that use the market leverage ratio as the dependent variable, Models (4)- (6) report the results that use the book leverage ratio as the dependent variable, and Models (7)- (9) report the results that use the interest coverage ratio as the dependent variable. In all regressions except Model (8) where
Claim Stock is used to measure intellectual capital, the coefficient estimates of interest, β 2 , are all significantly positive at the 10% level. It tends to be a bit weaker when the interest coverage ratio is used to measure leverage. The results thus suggest that an increase in intellectual capital enhances a given firm's debt capacity over time (i.e., in a five-year time window). In all regressions, we also control for the initial level of intellectual capital (the level of intellectual capital lagged for five years, e.g., Citation Stock t−5 in Model (1). Interestingly, we find that the estimated coefficient of this variable is negative in all models, although it is not significant in most cases. These results seem to suggest that the initial condition matters in firms' financing decision. That is, if a firm had a higher level of intellectual capital five years ago, then its leverage ratio will not change that much with the increase in its intellectual capital over time.
16 Using other time windows yields largely the same results.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated a relatively unexplored question in the capital structure literature: "How does a firm's intellectual capital affect its financing decision?" To this end, we have incorporated intellectual capital into a standard real options model of capital structureà la Leland (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001) . There are two distinct channels through which intellectual capital affects a firm's financing decision. One the one hand, a higher level of intellectual capital limits the firm's debt capacity because of its low liquidation value in case of bankruptcy. On the other hand, a higher level of intellectual capital augments the firm's debt capacity because of its positive impact on earnings dynamics. Our model analytically shows that the firm chooses its optimal capital structure to trade off the above two effects such that a positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage (measured by market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios) prevails.
We have empirically tested the predictions of our model by examining the financing behavior of U.S. firms. To measure the amount of intellectual capital to which a firm has access, we have constructed three patent-based variables using the NBER patent database: the patent stock, the citation-weighted patent stock, and the claim-weighted patent stock. We have documented robust empirical evidence that our patent-based metrics for intellectual capital positively affect market leverage, book leverage, and interest coverage ratios. The impact of intellectual capital on firm leverage is both statistically and economically significant. Specifically, we have found that a onestandard-deviation-increase in firm-level intellectual capital leads to a 11.7-27.3% increase in the firm's market leverage ratio from the sample mean level (22.2%). We have also found that the positive relationship between intellectual capital and leverage is much stronger for high-tech firms than for non-high-tech firms. Everything else equal, the intellectual capital effect on firm leverage for high-tech firms is about two to four times as large as that for non-high-tech firms. Finally, we have documented time-series evidence that changes in intellectual capital are positively related to changes in leverage ratios over a five-year time window. ) is the change in leverage ratio from t-5 to t. The independent variables are defined as the change from t-5 to t as well. All variable definitions can be found in Table 1 . In this table, we also include the intellectual capital measure at t-5 as one of the independent variables to control for initial conditions. Since the estimated coefficients of the intellectual capital variables are in general very small, we divide the three patent-based variables by 1,000. Thus, our interpretation of the regression results changes accordingly. The absolute values of t-statistics based on robust standard errors appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. * , **, *** significant at the 10% , 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
